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(Cash Cropping Incentives, Food Market Performance and the 
Divergence between 'National and Household Comparative Advantage:
Evidence from Zimbabwe
I. Introduction / . ■ •/ '
A growing body of evidence throughout Sub-Saharan Africa argues for the pursuit of a 
food security strategy based on diversification of smallholder agriculture into high-valued 
cash crops.1- The empirical record suggests that, in many semi-arid areas, cash crops such 
as cotton, sunflower and groundnut provide higher returns to land and labor than food 
grains and thus present major opportunities to promote smallholder income growth, food 
security and national foreign exchange generation. Empirical findings have also shown 
that, to the extent that food and cash crops require labor dr draft inputs at different 
periods, crop diversification ijiqy generate a significantly higher value of output for a 
given bundle of inputs.2 .
In spite of these findings, smallholders in most semi-arid areas of Africa continue to 
' devote up to 90% of their cropped.land to food grains. This is especially ironic in the 
semi-arid areas, considering the drought-tolerance of oilseeds compared with maize and 
sorghum. While several constraints to the expansion of cash cropping are well known - 
- poor seed delivery systems, disease and pest problems, and risks associated with 
acquiring food from unreliable markets where prices and availability fluctuate 
considerably -  the expected profitability of these crops relative to grain crops has 
normally not been questioned.
This paper suggests that cash crop production may be economically unviable — despite 
providing higher returns to land and labor than grain crops -  in an environment of high 
food marketing costs to rural areas. A simple conceptual, model is presented to show 
that the seemingly higher financial returns to cash crops over grain production are based 
on the implicit assumption that farmers are self-sufficient ;in grain. Evidence suggests, 
however,.that most farm households in the semi-arid areas of Sub-Saharan Africa are net 
, grain purchasers despite devoting the bulk of their resources to grain production. For 
these households, the opportunity cost of cash crop production is not the net returns to 
growing and selling food grains, but rather the. cost of acquiring the grain'foregone by 
cultivating cash crops, which is related to acquisition costs of grain rather than selling 
\ prices. Typical assessments of crop profitability (e.g., returns to land and labor) may be 
v based on the wrong prices, and thus provide misleading information to national extension 
services and policy makers about desired crop composition to raise farm incomes qnd. 
national agricultural growth. Large wedges often observed between rural producer and 
consumer grain prices may make cash crop production unprofitable until enough grain 
is planted for household consumption requirements. .
. These theoretical implications are, supported by econometric evidence from.Zimbabwe 
indicating that cultivation op various oilseed crops for the market, which often provide 
substantially higher rates of return under semi-arid smallholder conditions than grain, is
closely associated with the degree of grain self-sufficiency of the household. Controlling
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for differences in household assets and location, grain-surplus households in five semi- 
arid regions of Zimbabwe were found to cultivate 48% more oilseed crops for the 
riiarket than their grain-deficit neighbors. The results indicate that, in situations where 
productivity gains through new technology are not on the immediate horizon, policy 
efforts to raise rural incomes, through crop diversification are critically dependent on the 
development of food markets that reduce the consumer price of staple grain in rural 
areas. Moreover, the micro-level effects of artificially high food marketing costs on 
cropping patterns and household incomes may have important mayro-level reverberations 
by skewing cropping patterns away from those of comparative advantage and agricultural 
growth. Finally, the results suggest'that the direction of causality between cash crop 
production and household income may run both ways: those households that engage in 
substantial cash cropping may have higher incomes, yet in an environment of high food 
marketing costs, the ability to engage in cash cropping appears dependent on adequate 
household productive assets over and above those needed for subsistence grain 
production needs. \
II., Conceptual Framework
Typically, when commodities such as food are bought and sold by smallholders, the farrh- 
gate price is some fraction of the purchase price. The width of the wedge between these 
prices is a function of transportation infrastructure, policy-related factors, and institutions 
which coordinate exchange across space, time and form. Moreover, risks associated with 
uncertain prices and supplies create perceived certainty-equivalent prices that are lower 
than observed farm-gate prices and higher than observed purchase prices, thus further 
widening the price wedge.3
The evidence is now overwhelming that throughout much of semi-arid Sub-Saharan 
Africa, a large proportion of rural farm households cannot or do not produce enough • 
grain to feed themselves and are purchasers of grain.4 Therefore, returns to crop 
production for sale may not accurately represent the relative profitability o f alternative 
crops. For grain-deficit households, the decision to grow a hectare of cash crops must 
be at the expense of a hectare of food grain for home consumption. In this case, the 
decision facing the smallholder is whether to (1) grow oilseed or other crops for cash to 
buy back grain for home use, or (2) produce the grain directly for home usev The 
relevant grain price in Strategy (.1) is the cost of acquiring staple grain, not the producer 
price. Strategy (1) is a food security strategy based on the argument that income from 
cash crop cultivation can buy back more grain than could) have been produced if those 
same resources were devoted to food crop production. Strategy (2) would have the 
manifestation of an apparent food self-sufficiency strategy, but would also represent a 
more productive use of available household resources if the income generated from cash 
crop cultivation on an additional unit of land were not sufficient to buy back the quantity 
of grain for consumption that could have been produced on that unit of land. For all 
farmers, the decision rule for choice of crop on each additional hectare put under 
cultivation is: grow cash crops if' '
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Y, > D f P P ^  - Cgr] - (l-D)[Qgrsx(PCgr - m) - C y  (1)
where:' Yj = expected gross margin qf cash crop i (Z$/hectare);
D = 1 'if, given the outcome of the decision rule of the previous marginal
hectare, the household expects to be food self-sufficient;5
= 0 if, given the outcome of the decision rule of the previous marginal 
hectare, the household expects to be food deficit; 1
PPg,. = grain producer price (Z$/kg); ' , ’
Qg,. = expected grain,production per hectare (kgs/hectare);
Cg, = grain variable costs of production (Z$/hectare); 
s = proportion of grain production that is consumable over one year, 
v accounting for storage losses (% of kgs produced); '
x ’ = extraction rate from grain to meal (%);
PCgr = acquisition price of grain meal in rural area (Z$/kg); 
m = milling cost to convert grain to meal (Z$/kg);
If, given the allocation decisions on the previous land units, the household expects to be 
grain surplus (D = 1), the decision rule reduces to a simple comparison of gross margins- ' 
from'grain and oilseed crop i. If, however, the household expects to be grain-deficit, 
cultivation of oilseed crop i means that one hectare of maize for home consumption is 
foregone: The second bracketed term, [Qgrsx(PCgr - mj - Cgr], accounts for the net cost 
of purchasing the amount of grain meal that 'could have been produced on that' hectare, 
accounting for storage losses, grain-to-meal milling losses, milling costs and production 
costs incurred if the household produced and processed the grain itself. .
This model suggests that, ceteris paribus, the viability of producing oilseeds by net grain 
purchasing households is negatively related to the acquisition price of grain meal, not the 
producer price of grain. The greater the wedge between these producer and consuiher 
prices, the greater the divergence in the value of grain by grain surpilus and deficit 
households. The higher the acquisition cost, of staple food relative to producer prices for 
cash crops, the less incentive for grain-deficit households to diversify, ceteris paribus.
In many sub-Saharan African countries, marketing margins between producer and 
consumer food prices are large compared with those in other developing areas.6 The 
organization of official grain marketing systems in many East and Southern African 
countries features a predominantly one-way flow of grain from rural to urban areas and 
is characterized by centralized urban milling and storage facilities.7 This structure 
implicitly assumes rural self-sufficiency in'grain. Moreover, national food policies often 
restrict private movement of grain directly from surplus to deficit rural areas and thus , 
inflate marketing costs and consumer prices in the latter areas. In some countries such 
as Zimbabwe, a circuitous flow of grain has evolved in which marketed grain surpluses 
flow out of rural areas through the official marketing Channel to be milled in urban areas 
and are then returned to other rural areas in the form of commercial maize meal.8 
„ ;Because of superfluous transport costs and relatively, high milling margins of centralized 
urban millers, the price of commercial maize meal is typically 110% to 140% higher than - 
' the official producer price.91 ’ •
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How does the large wedge between producer and consumer maize prices affect 
smallholder incentives to produce groundnuts and sunflower, the major non-food cash 
crops in semi-arid Zimbabwe? By rearranging inequality (1) slightly, the net revenue 
remaining to the household (Zj) from planting oilseed crop i rather than grain is:
Zj =' Y; - D[PPgrQgr - Cgr] - (l-D)[Qgrsx(PCgr - m) - Cgr] . (2)
In order to assess whether the wedge between producer and consumer maize prices is 
large enough to alter the sign of Z; for grain surplus and deficit households, equation (2) 
is calculated using survey data on crop production costs and returns in. four semi-arid 
smallholder areas collected by the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural 
Resettlement (MLARR).10 ' ^
Results are presented in Table 1. For households that are grain surplus, the oilseed 
. crops give clearly higher rates of return to land and labor (not shown) in all areas. 
These results are consistent with, those of the World Bank,11 which also indicate that 
sunflower and groundnut provide consistently higher returns to land, labor and capital 
than the grain crops in the semi-arid areas. This type of analysis implicitly assumes self- 
sufficiency in grain, i.e., that the opportunity cost of using farm resources for oilseed 
production is the returns from alternative crops for sale.
When the assumption of grain self-sufficiency is'relaxed, oilseed production becomes 
distinctly less viable, In seven of nine cases where oilseeds gave higher gross margins 
than maize, this result was reversed when the' opportunity cost of this land was conceived 
in terms of grain foregone for consumption (valued at the consumer price) rather than 
grain foregone for selling (at the producer price). These contrasting results are due to 
the large difference between maize producer prices and consumer maize meal costs.12
III. The Model
The foregoing suggests, that, in the areas analyzed by MLARR, smallholders may have 
little incentive to produce oilseeds for the market until enough land and resources have 
been devoted to grain for self-sufficiency. Beyond this point, however, one, may expect y 
that extra productive resources would be increasingly used for cash crop production, if 
these crops provide higher returns for sale. It does not follow that all remaining land 
and resources in excess of that required for grain self-sufficiency should be devoted to 
oilseeds, because of various non-market purposes for growing surplus grain such as gifts, 
beer brewing for ceremonial functions, livestock feed and insurance stocks. In addition, 
recent research from elsewhere in Africa indicates that there are important 
complementarities between grain and cash crop production. In Senegal, Goetz found 
that crop diversification allowed farmers to more fully utilize farm inputs, to the extent 
that food and cash crops require labor or draft inputs at different periods, and thus 
generate a higher value of output for a given bundle of inputs.13 In southern Mali, D ione, 
found that households producing cotton were more likely to have animal traction . 
equipment, access to credit and technical inputs, and as a result produce more grain crops.14
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The discussion leads to two specific empirical questions:
Ql: is oilseed cultivation higher, ceteris paribus, among grain-surplus households than 
grain-deficit households?; and t,
Q2: if complementarities exist between grain and oilseed production, is there any 
difference in the ability to exploit them between grain-deficit and, surplus 
 ^ households?
Note that these questions do not stem from behavioral assumptions aboqt smallholders 
responses to market and production risks, although these factors are undoubtedly 
important in many areas. While it is often noted that smallholders appear to .strives for 
grain self-sufficiency along with' any new ventures into cash cropping, it is unlikely that 
risks associated with the availability or price of staple grain are important causes of this 
behavior in Zimbabwe, since staple maize meal is consistently available throughout the 
year at fixed prices (or slightly above) even in the most remote areas. Moreover, 
Zimbabwe’s Grain Marketing Board, which buys the bulk of smallholder grain, and 
sunflower sold nationally, offers fixed prices with no variation within years and very little 
variation in real prices between years. Rather, Q l and Q2 are based on the theoretical 
implications from Section II that oilseed cultivation for sale may not be'economically 
viable for grain-deficit households -  despite providingrhigher returns to land and labor 
than grain -  depenping on the level of food marketing costs and consumer prices in rural 
areas. . '
Q l and Q2 are examined econometrically using cross-sectional survey data from 495 
households in five semi-arid smallholder areas in Zimbabwe. It is widely considered that, 
due to yield variations, area planted is a more accurate reflection of resource allocation 
than ex post production outcomes, hence the use of oilseed area as the dependent 
variable.15 Area planted to oilseeds was regressed on predetermined variables entering 
a standard production function such as nbmber of draft animals, labor input and capital 
equipment, as well as the degree of household grain self-sufficiency. Since decisions 
affecting grain self-sufficiency are not made independently of area planted to oilseeds, 
estimated values from two auxiliary equations are used in the estimation of oilseed area. 
With the symbol denoting an estimated value, the set of equations is:
yi = fi(x) + ex  ^ - (3-a) •■■■.
SSL* = yj* + ST - REQ (3-b)
y2 = f2(x, SSL*) + e2 •' > ; , (3-c)
where y /  is the predicted value of grain production used to estimate the level of grain 
self-sufficiency (SSL*), x is a vector of predetermined household asset variables described 
below, ST is household grain stocks at the beginning of the harvest period, REQ is grain , 
consumption requirements, (based on the number of resident adults and children),16 and 
y2 is area planted to oilseed crops with the intention of sale. Both grain stocks and 
( consumption requirements are considered known with reasonable accuracy at planting , 
time. Prices of oilseeds and grain crops Were excluded because the Grain Marketing
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IBoard’s policy of pan-territorial and pan-seasonal pricing creates a lack of observed price 
variation among househplds.
Q1 and Q2 may be test^i in equation (3-c) by allowing the slope and intercept linking 
cash crop area to the degree-of household grain self-sufficiency to change at the point 
at which self-sufficiency is reached.. The specification of (3-c) used here is
y2 = aO + aj(L) + a2(DRAFT) + a3(EQUIP),
+ j| b j(LOCj) + a4(SSL‘) + a5(D) + a6(SSL*)D , (4)
where L is household labor expressed in adult equivalents, DRAFT is the number of 
draft animals, EQUIP is the value of animal traction equipment owned, and LOCj are 
area-specific dummy variables to account for variations , in soil, rainfall, and • 
infrastructural conditions between households in different regions. D is a dummy 
variable which takes on a value of one for households in which SSL* > 0 and zero 
otherwise. Under the assumption that oilseed cultivation is not influenced by the 
achievement or the degree of grain self-sufficiency, a5 and a6 equal zero and equation (4) 
reduces to
y2 =: aO + a^L) + a2(DRAFT) + a3(EQUIP) + a4(SSL*)
••+ ^.bj(LOCj) (5)
Using regression results from equations (4) and (5), Q1 may be empirically examined via 
an F-test of the joint hypothesis that a5=a6 = 0. Q2 may be examined by-comparing the 
magnitude and significance of a4 and a6. ;
IV. Data and Characteristics of the Sample
The cross-sectional household data was drawn from field surveys of 495 families selected 
randomly within 20 wards in five smallholder areas between April 1990 and March 1991. 
Average annual rainfall within each region ranges from 400 - 700 mm. Rainfall during 
the production period was slightly below average.
To facilitate visual comparison, the total sample of households was stratified into 
quintiles according to their net grain sales during the year.17 Characteristics of these 
grain quintiles are summarized in Table 2. Across all quintiles, grain and oilseeds 
constituted 76% and 19% of total cropped area. The proportion of households growing 
oilseeds with the intention of selling varied from 33% among the bottom grain quintile 
to 63% among the top quintile. The most common responses among households in the 
grain-deficit quintiles as to why they did not grow more grain to feed themselves were 
lack of sufficient land and draft power: This is in spite the fact that an average of 79% 
of their cropped land was already devoted to grain.18 On the other hand, smallholders 
in the grain-surplus quintiles increasingly mentioned the profitability of other crops as 
the main reason why they did not plant more grain.
The distribution of land, value' oT equipment and number of draft animals among 
households varied widely between households in different quintiles. Other researchers
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have also noted a very skewed distribution of land, draft animals and other productive 
resources among smallholder households.19 This may explain why approximately 10% 
of the relatively well-equipped households typically account for over 50% of the grain 
crop income generated in these areas. The grain-surplus quintiles also had, on average, 
substantially higher per capita inqomes from farm and non-farm sources.
V. Results
Coefficient estimates for equations (4) and (5) are presented in Table 3. All household 
asset variables had the expected sign and were significant at the 5% level or lower, with 
the exception of household labor. The hypothesis that oilseed cultivation did not differ 
between grain surplus and grain-deficit households, i.e.; that a5 = a6 = 0, was rejected at 
the .05 level of significance. Controlling for differences in household assets and location, 
grain-surplus households were estimated to cultivate, on average, 0.70 hectares of oilseed, 
crops for the market compared with 0.47 hectares by their grain-deficit neighbors. In the 
■! driest and most grain-deficit location, oilseed area was estimated .04 hectares and .27 
hectares for grain-deficit, and grain-surplus households, respectively. The sign of a4 
indicates no complementarities between grain and oilseed production among grain-deficit 
households. However, once the point of Self-sufficiency is reached, household oilseed 
. cultivation is estimated to increase by 0.21 hectares for every additional ton of grain 
produced. ,
Note that these empirical results pertain to a market environment in which staple grain 
meal is consistently available throughout the year at stable prices. Price monitoring 
surveys conducted bi-weekly in a broad range of rural areas in Zimbabwe indicate that 
the controlled selling prices of commercial maize meal, set by government, are normally 
respected and appear to be exceeded by at most 10% even in the most remote rural 
areas.29 Moreover, historical reviews of grain marketing policy since 1980 indicate that 
commercial maize meal was in short supply , in rural areas only once (1983) due to 
government pricing policy in which subsidies on commercial maize meal (removed 
« entirely since 1986) were so large that the milling capacity of urban processors was 
temporarily exceeded. While smallholders’ observed self-sufficiency behavior is 
commonly attributed to market risks associated with fluctuations in food price and 
availability, and is undoubtedly important in  ^many developing areas, this explanation 
does not appear compelling in other areas such as Zimbabwe.
VL Conclusions and Policy Implications
; Assessments of,relative profitability between food and cash crops are typically made with 
reference to producer prices of alternative crops and thus implicitly assume that farmers 
are food self-sufficient. Such calculations may not accurately reflect the most economic 
use of farm resources in food deficit areas since these calculations do not measure the 
true opportunity.cost of devoting scarce productive resources to non-food crops. Such 
j analyses may provide misleading information to national extension services and policy 
makers about desired crop mix to raise smallholder incomes and food security.
Smallholders’ overriding concern with food self-sufficiency, commonly explained in terms 
of risk aversion, may also be explained on the basis of expected net returns in an 
environment of high food marketing margins and acquisition costs in rural areas. 
Despite providing-higher returns for sale, the strategy of oilseed production/food 
purchase appeared to be unprofitable relative to food production for grain-deficit 
households in seven of nine cases analyzed. Econometric results from five survey areas 
of Zimbabwe also indicate that, in general, grain-deficit households are purchasers not 
because they are growing higherwalued crops with which to buy food, but because they 
do not have the productive resources to grow enough, staple food to feed themselves.
• ' • *
While mounting evidence from a wide range of developing areas indicates that those 
smallholders that engage in substantial cash cropping have higher incomes than those 
that do not,21 the direction of causality has not been adequately examined. The 
correlation between cash cropping and household income, while often interpreted as 
evidence to promote cash cropping, would also result from a situation in which 
diversification were generally undertaken by households that, possessed sufficient 
purchased inputs-and farm assets to assure food self-sufficiency and used residual 
resources to expand into cash cropping. Not surprisingly, numerous studies throughout 
Africa have found that household food production, cash crop production and per capita 
incomes are all highly correlated.22
How much lower must the consumer price of staple meal be in Zimbabwe in order to , 
make oilseed production viable for grain-deficit smallholders? The answer to this 
question can be found by setting net revenue in equation (2) to zero and solving for PC^. 
These threshold consumer-prices for grain meal are presented in the last column of 
Table 1. In Several cases, these threshold prices are less than 15% lower than the 
current price of commercial maize meal. This is noteworthy because previous research 
in Zimbabwe has estimated that the current controls on grain movement, which restrict, 
grain from moving directly from surplus to deficit areas, inflate consumer grain prices 
by as much as 25%.23 ' ” f, '
Removal of such restrictions and active support for the development of intra-rural trade 
could simultaneously contribute to governments’ food security and agricultural growth 
objectives, by both reducing the cost of food purchased and by raising the value of farm 
output sold. . Such policies are apparently neglected because of the conventional 
perception that farm households are predominantly food self-sufficient. This 
misconception underscores the negative effects of uni-directional single-channel state 
marketing systems commonly found in East and Southern Africa, which are primarily 
geared to extract grain out of rural areas and into urban milling, storage and 
consumption centers. ; ■ , . ;
Available domestic resource cost analyses in Zimbabwe indicate that oilseed crops tend 
to be more efficient generators of foreign exchange than grain crops.24 Thus, more 
efficient rural food markets, to the extent that they, reduce the opportunity cost of cash 
crop production, may be an important precondition for stimulating dynamic changes in 
crop mix more consistent with comparative advantage, agricultural growth and foreign 
exchange generation. J This must, of course, be complemented by institutional and 
technological improvements within the cash crop sub-sectors themselves.
I Several caveats to this analysis must be discussed for more detailed examination in future 
■ research. First, the analysis examines the effect of a household being grain deficit on its 
incentives to grow oilseeds for sale. The analysis does not examine household incentives 
to grow oilseeds for own consumption, gifts, or^pther non-market purposes. Second, the 
analysis does not examine the effect of production risk on the relative incentives to grow 
oilseeds, which may be especially relevant in semi-arid areas prone to frequent drought. 
In such cases, the yield stability of grains vs. oilseeds becomes important. The risk of 
drought may induce households to put more of their land in grain to assure adequate 
supplies even under poor yield conditions. Finally, the analysis did not examine how off- 
farm employment opportunities affect grain and cash crop production. The introduction 
of a competing source of labor income may alter the trade-offs somewhat between grain 
and oilseed production. However, the wedge between producer and consunier food 
prices creates the same dual calculation for off-farm employment as for cash crops, in : 
so far as off-farm employment may provide higher returns to labor than those to 
production of food valued at the selling price, but not necessarily at the purchase price. 
Further analysis of the relationship between rural food markets and alternative crop 
production in other countries would help gauge the robustness of these results.
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T^ble 1. Net revenue remaining after planting one hectare of oilseed crop and using the revenue to purchase 
maize meal foregone in selected semi-arid smallholder areas of Zimbabwe, calculated from equation (2).a
Smallholder Area Net revenue (Z;) for households . 
that are:
Net grain sellers Net grain buyers 
(D = l)  (D = 0)
% reduction in 
consumer price of 
maize meal for oilseed 
production/maize meal 
purchase strategy to 
break even ,
Buhera groundnut. 133 - i i  r ' .4 •;
sunflower 80 )' -64 19 '
Chiruma sunflower . 26 -229 36
groundnut -96 -351 59
Mutoko groundnut . 550 337 b
sunflower 133 -80. . 14
Nyajena groundnut , 221 138 b.
sunflower 79 -4 1
Zvishivane sunflower 68 -160 21 .
t groundnut
k.
19
:
-209 31
“Results are based on average tost, yield and price data collected from 276 households in semi-arid smallholder areas selected by 
MLARR (1990); bno decrease in maize meal consumer price is necessary because the strategy of oilseed production/maize. meal 
purchase is already profitable, according to the survey data.
Source: calculated from equation (2) using crop budget data from MLARR (1990), milling cost and outturn data from Chisvo et al., 
and storage loss data from Giga. '  , ' . i
i
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Tabic 2. Characteristics of farm households in study sample, disaggregated by net grain sales quintiles.8
• ,
-2,503
to
-378
Quintiles
-377
to
-95
ccording t(
-94
to
278
J net grain
279
tos
1,289'
sales (kgs
1,290
to
13,286
/hh) - - - - —
Total
sample
Number of households . 127, 125 127 . 123 . 126 628
family labor (adult equivalents) 834 6.45 6.12 6.92 7.90 • (7.16
draft animals , 4.87 5.46 4.66 6.34 11.11 637
value of draft equipment (Z$) - ! 981 911 1,035 ' 1,347 1^97 1,177
fertilizer applied to grain crops (iegs/ha)
X . . .
631 . 3.94 12.12 6.07 23.93 11.93
% households growing oilseeds . '/ 1
with intention of selling ' 33 . 44 . 50 ' 49 63 :
r- ' v 
oilseed area (ha) .30 .40' 036 0.61 0.95 35 .
grain .area'(ha) ^ 1.77 . 1.94 1.85 2.03 3.07 2.13
total area planted, (ha) . 2.28 2/44 2.46 2.77 4.14 • 2.82 ' , .
total area possessed (ha) 2.64 2.67 3.28 3.02 4.80 3.31
average grain yield (kgs/ha) 460 '520 796 1 1,251 1,960 990
Main constraint to increasing-area
■ S i
cultivated to grain (% of households , '
identifying the following):
not enough land: .37.4 24.3 16.8 22.7 14.3 . 23.1 y  '
draft power shortage: 1 27.6 293 25.7 , 16.8 123 22.3
labor shortage: 6.2 ( 11.4 14.8 10.9 .12.5 10.2
other crops more profitable:
, ' ' ’ ' ’ l .
4.2 3.4 14.4 . 17.2 . ,24.2, . i2 3  ■ • '
total income per resident ■ 176 164 230 303 317 237
‘Net grain sales is defined as the quantity of grain sold via barter and cash minus the quantity of grain purchased via barter and cash.
' 1 ' i
Source: University of Zimbabwe/Michigan State University Food Security Project surveys (1990-91).
.1
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Table 3. Coefficient estimates for factors affecting hectares planted to oilseed crops.
, Independent variables
Constant 1
Adult equivalent labor (L)
Draft animals (DRAFT)
value of draft equipment (EQUIP)
Location 1 dummy (LOCi)
Location 2 dummy (LOC2)
Location 3 dummy (LOC3)
Location 4 dummy (LOC4) , 
Expected self-sufficiency level (SSL* )3 
Expected self-sufficiency dummy (D) 
Interaction term (SSL *D)
Adjusted R-square: 
Sum of squared errors: 
Degrees of freedom:
Coefficients (t-statistics) 
for equation
(3)# ' (4)
-.089 .007 ,
(-.420) (•042)
-.076 -.071
(-1.64) (-1.54)
.052* .057*
(2.48) (2.7?)
3.80^** 3.66^**
(3.72) (3.58)
.186 .150
(1.31) (1.06)
.462 .421
(1.69) (1.53)
1.24* 1.32*
(2.17) (2.34)
1.49** 1.45**
(5.62) (5.45)
-1.28"4 1.34-*
(-0.59) (1.08)
.012'.
(.115)
2.094*
(2.27)
.258. .249
241.02 244.80
483 485 \
*(**) : significant at the 5% (1%) level or lower.
* Predicted values of the variable. The instruments in equation (3-a) include all of the household asset and
location variables shown here. The adjusted R-square and F-value of this'regression were ,27 and 23.05.
' 1
I ' ■
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